Abstract. Security protocols that provide privacy and anonymity guarantees are growing increasingly prevalent in the online world. The highly intricate nature of these protocols makes them vulnerable to subtle design flaws. Formal methods have been successfully deployed to detect these errors, where protocol correctness is formulated as a notion of equivalence (indistinguishably). The high overhead for verifying such equivalence properties, in conjunction with the fact that protocols are never run in isolation, has created a need for modular verification techniques. Existing approaches in formal modeling and (compositional) verification of protocols for privacy have abstracted away a fundamental ingredient in the effectiveness of these protocols, randomness. We present the first composition results for equivalence properties of protocols that are explicitly able to toss coins. Our results hold even when protocols share data (such as long term keys) provided that protocol messages are tagged with the information of which protocol they belong to.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are often analyzed in the so-called symbolic model, where the assumption of perfect cryptography is made. Messages are symbolic terms modulo an equational theory (as opposed to bit-strings) and cryptographic operations are modeled via equations in the theory. The threat model is that of the Dolev-Yao attacker [33] , in which the attacker has the ability to read, intercept and replay all messages on public channels and can also nondeterministically inject its own messages into the network. Verification techniques in this domain are fairly mature and a number of sophisticated analysis tools have been developed [12, 34, 8] .
Automated tools based on Dolev-Yao analysis are fundamentally limited to protocols that are purely non-deterministic, where non-determinism is used to model concurrency as well as the interaction between protocol participants with their environment. The order and nature of these interactions is determined entirely by an attacker (also known as a scheduler) who resolves all nondeterminism. There are, however, a large class of protocols whose correctness depends on an explicit ability to model and reason about coin tosses. With privacy goals in mind, these protocols lie at the heart of many anonymity systems such as Crowds [49] , mix-networks [20] , onion routers [37] and Tor [32] . Randomization is also used in cryptographic protocols to achieve fair exchange [11, 35] , voter privacy in electronic voting [51] and denial of service prevention [39] . The privacy and anonymity properties achieved by these systems are often formulated in terms protocol equivalence (indistinguishability). For example, protocol equivalence is used in the analysis of properties like anonymity, unlinkability, and vote privacy [30, 6] .
Catherine Meadows, in her summary of the over 30 year history of formal techniques in cryptographic protocol analysis [45, 46] , identified the development formal analysis techniques for anonymous communication systems as a fundamental and still largely unsolved challenge. The main difficulty in adapting Dolev-Yao analysis to such randomized protocols has been the subtle interaction between non-determinism and randomization -if the attacker is allowed to "observe" the results of the private coin tosses in its scheduling decisions, then the analysis may reveal "security flaws" in correct protocols (see examples in [21, 14, 36, 18, 16] ). In order to circumvent this problem, many authors [29, 21, 14, 36, 18, 16, 10, 17] have proposed that protocols be analyzed only with respect to attackers that are forced to take the same action in any two protocol executions that are indistinguishable. For the indistinguishability relation on traces, we propose [10, 17] trace-indistinguishability of applied-pi calculus processes [2] . In this framework, an attacker is a function from traces, the equivalence classes on executions under the trace-indistinguishability relation, to the set of attacker actions.
We consider the problem of composition for randomized protocols when the protocols are allowed to share data, such as keys. Our focus here is on equivalence properties. Two randomized protocols P and Q are said to be trace equivalent [17] , if for each attacker A and trace t, the measure of executions in the trace t obtained when A interacts with protocol P is exactly the same as the measure of executions in the trace t obtained when A interacts with protocol Q. The protocols themselves are specified as processes in an applied pi-style calculus, parametrized by an equational theory that models cryptographic primitives. The protocols in our formalism are simple; a protocol is said to be simple if there is no principal-level nondeterminism [25] . As observed in [17] , this notion of indistinguishability coincides with the notion of trace-equivalence for simple non-randomized protocols.
Contributions:
We begin by considering the case when the number of sessions in a protocol is bounded. Our first result (Theorem 1 on Page 11) captures the conditions under which the composition of equivalent protocols under disjoint equational theories preserves trace equivalence. Formally, consider trace equivalent protocols P and Q over equational theory E a , and trace equivalent protocols P and Q over equational theory E b , where E a and E b are disjoint. We show that the composition of P and P is equivalent to the composition of Q and Q , provided the shared secrets between P and P and those between Q and Q are kept with probability 1. While such a result also holds for non-randomized protocols (see [27, 5] for example), randomization presents its own challenges.
The first challenge arises from the fact that even if P and Q do not leak shared secrets (with P and Q, respectively), they may still reveal the equalities that hold amongst the shared secrets. Revealing these equalities may, in some cases, allow the attacker to infer the result of a private coin toss (See Example 5 on Page 13). Consequently, our composition theorem requires that P and Q remain trace equivalent even when such equalities are revealed. The revelation of the equalities is achieved by adding actions to protocols P and Q that reveal "hashes" of shared secrets.
As in the case of non-randomized protocols [27, 5] , the proof proceeds by showing that it suffices to consider the case when P (Q) does not share any secrets with P (Q respectively). This is achieved by observing that if the composition of P and P is not trace equivalent to the composition of Q and Q , then there must be a trace t and an individual execution ρ in the composition of P and P (or of Q and Q ) such that ρ belongs to t and there is no execution in the composition of Q and Q (or of P and P respectively) in the trace t. It is then observed that if the shared secrets between P and P , and between Q and Q , are re-initialized to fresh values respecting the same equalities amongst them as in the execution ρ, then the transformed protocols continue to remain trace inequivalent. For randomized protocols, we no longer have an individual execution that witnesses protocol inequivalence. Instead we have an attacker A and a trace t which occurs with different probabilities when the protocols interact with A. Observe that the executions corresponding to the trace t will then form a tree, and different equalities amongst the shared secrets may hold in different branches. Thus, a simple transformation as in the case of non-randomized protocols no longer suffices (see Example 3 on Page 11). Instead, we have to perform a non-trivial inductive argument (with induction on number of coin tosses) to show that it suffices to consider the case when P (Q) does not share any secrets with P (Q respectively).
Our second result concerns the case when the equational theories E a and E b are the same, each containing cryptographic primitives for symmetric encryption, symmetric decryption and hashes (see Theorem 2 on Page 14). For this case, we show that the composition of randomized protocols preserves trace equivalence when the protocols are allowed to share secrets, provided protocol messages are tagged with the information of which protocol they belong to. As in the case of non-randomized protocols, this is achieved by showing that in presence of tagging, the protocols can be transformed to new protocols P new , P new , Q new , Q new such that P new and Q new are trace equivalent protocols with equational theory E new , and P new and Q new are trace equivalent protocols with disjoint equational theory E new . Thus, this result follows from our first result.
Our final result extends the above result to the case of unbounded number of sessions (see Theorem 3 on Page 16). We again consider the case when the equational theories E a and E b are the same, containing cryptographic primitives for symmetric encryption, symmetric decryption and hashes. In order to achieve this result, we additionally require that messages from each session are tagged with a unique session identifier.
Related Work. For the non-randomized case, a number of papers have identified requirements for proving protocol compositions secure. Safety properties are considered in [28, 42, 40, 41, 3, 24, 26, 7, 31, 22, 27, 47, 5] and indistinguishability properties in [4, 5] . A recent work [10] has also explored the composition of randomized protocols with respect to reachability properties. In the computational model, the problem of composing protocols securely has been studied in [13, 15] . Our result is most closely related to [4, 5, 10] .
Much of research effort on mechanically analyzing anonymity systems has used techniques based on model checking and simulation. For example, [53] uses the PRISM model checker [44] to analyze the Crowds system. While these works are valuable, the techniques are ad-hoc in nature, and don't naturally extend to larger classes of protocols. In [52] , an analysis of Chaum's Dinning cryptographers protocol [19] was carried out the in CSP framework [43] . In all of these works, the messages constructed by the attacker is assumed to be bounded. [17] consider the complexity of the problem of verifying bounded number of sessions of simple randomized cryptographic protocols that use symmetric and asymmetric encryption. They show that checking secrecy properties is coNEXPTIME-complete and the problem of checking indistinguishability is decidable in coNEXPTIME. In contrast, both of these problems are known to be coNP-complete for non-randomized protocols [25, 23, 9, 50] . The increased overhead in the verification effort that comes with the introduction of randomization in protocols places a premium on modular verification techniques, allowing smaller analysis efforts to be stitched together.
Protocols
In this section we introduce our process algebra for modeling security protocols with coin tosses. Our formalism can be seen as an extension of the one from [4] . Similar to [38] , it extends the applied π-calculus by the inclusion of a new operator for probabilistic choice. Like [4] , the calculus doesn't include else branches and considers a single public channel. We will assume the reader is familiar with the models of Markov chains (DTMC) and partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP); for completeness these definitions can be found in the full version of this paper [1].
Terms, equational theories and frames
A signature F contains a finite set of function symbols, each with an associated arity. We assume countably infinite and pairwise disjoint sets of special constant symbols N and M, where N and M represent public and private names, respectively. Variable symbols are the union of two disjoint sets X and X w (where F ∩(X ∪X w ) = ∅) representing protocol and frame variables, respectively. Terms are built by the application of function symbols to variables and terms in the standard way. Given a signature F and Y ⊆ X ∪ X w , we use T (F, Y) to denote the set of terms built over F and Y. The set of variables occurring in a term u is denoted by vars(u). A ground term is one that contains no free variables.
A substitution σ is a partial function that maps variables to terms such that the domain of σ is finite. dom(σ) will denote the domain and ran(σ) will denote the range. For a substitution σ with dom(σ) = {x 1 , ..., x k }, we denote σ as {x 1 → σ(x 1 ), ..., x k → σ(x k )}. A substitution σ is said to be ground if every term in ran(σ) is ground and a substitution with an empty domain will be denoted as ∅. Substitutions can be extended to terms in the usual way and we write tσ for the term obtained by applying the substitution σ to the term t.
Our process algebra is parameterized by a non-trivial equational theory (F, E), where E is a set of F-Equations. By an F-Equation, we mean a pair u = v where u, v ∈ T (F \ N , X ) are terms that do not contain private names. Two terms u and v are said to be equal with respect to an equational theory (F, E), denoted u = E v, if E u = v in the first order theory of equality. We assume that if two terms containing names are equal, they will remain equal when the names are replaced by arbitrary terms. We often identify an equational theory (F, E) by E when the signature is clear from the context. Processes are executed in an environment that consists of a frame ϕ and a binding substitution σ. Formally, σ : X → T (F) and ϕ : X w → T (F).
Two frames ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are said to be statically equivalent if dom(ϕ 1 ) = dom(ϕ 2 ) and for all r 1 , r 2 ∈ T (F \ N , X w ) we have r 1 ϕ 1 = E r 2 ϕ 1 iff r 1 ϕ 2 = E r 2 ϕ 2 . Intuitively, two frames are statically equivalent if an attacker cannot distinguish between the information they contain. A term u ∈ T (F) is deducible from a frame ϕ with recipe r ∈ T (F \ N , dom(ϕ)) in equational theory E, denoted ϕ r E u, if rϕ = E u. We often omit r and E and write ϕ u if they are clear from the context.
An equational theory E 0 is called trivial if u = E0 v for any terms u, v and otherwise it is said to be non-trivial. For the rest of the paper, F b and F c are signatures with disjoint sets of function symbols and (F b , E b ) and (F c , E c ) are non-trivial equational theories. The combination of these two theories will be
Syntax
We assume a countably infinite set of labels L and an equivalence relation ∼ on L that induces a countably infinite set of equivalence classes. For l ∈ L, [l] denotes the equivalence class of l. We use L b and L c to range over subsets of L such that L b ∩ L c = ∅ and both L b and L c are closed under ∼. Each equivalence class is assumed to contain a countably infinite set of labels. Operators in our grammar will come with a unique label from L, which together with the relation ∼, will be used to mask the information an attacker can obtain about actions of a process. So, when an action with label l is executed, the attacker will only be able to infer [l] .
The syntax of processes is introduced in Figure 1 . We begin by introducing what we call basic processes, denoted by B, B 1 , B 2 , ...B n . In the definition of basic processes, p ∈ [0, 1], l ∈ L, x ∈ X and c i ∈ { , u = v}∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} where
Basic Processes
In the case of the assignment rule (x := u) l , we additionally require that x ∈ vars(u). Intuitively, basic processes will be used to represent the actions of a particular protocol participant. The 0 process does nothing. The process νx l creates a fresh name and binds it to x while (x := u) l assigns the term u to the variable
.., k} and otherwise, if some c i is u = v and u = E v, the process deadlocks. The process in(x) l reads a term u from the public channel and binds it to x and the process out(u) l outputs a term on the public channel. The processes P · l Q sequentially executes P followed by Q whereas the process P + l p Q behaves like P with probability p and like Q with probability 1 − p.
We will assume a countable set of process variables X c , whose typical elements will be denoted by , 1 , ..., m . In Figure 1 , basic contexts are obtained by extending basic processes with a single process variable from X c . Basic contexts will be denoted by
] denotes the process that results from replacing every occurrence of in D 1 by B 1 . A context is then a sequential composition of fresh variable creations and variable assignments followed by the parallel composition of a set of basic contexts. The prefix of variable creations and assignments is used to instantiate data common to one or more basic contexts. A process is nothing but a context that does not contain any process variables. We will use C, C 1 , C 2 , ..., C n to denote contexts and P , Q or R to denote processes. For a context C[ 1 , ..., m ] and basic processes B 1 , ..., B m , C[B 1 , ..., B m ] denotes the process that results from replacing each process variable i by B i .
) is said to be well-formed if every operator has a unique label and for any labels l 1 and
For the remainder of this paper, contexts are assumed to be well-formed. A process that results from replacing process variables in a context by basic processes is also assumed to be well-formed. Unless otherwise stated, we will always assume that all of the labels in a basic process come from the same equivalence class.
Convention 1 For readability, we will omit process labels when they are not relevant in a particular setting. Whenever new actions are added to a process, their labels are assumed to be fresh and not equivalent to any existing labels of that process.
For a process Q, fv(Q) and bv(Q) denote the set of variables that have some free or bound occurrence in Q, respectively. The formal definition is standard and is presented in Appendix A for completeness. Processes containing no free variables are called ground. We restrict our attention to processes that do not contain variables with both free and bound occurrences. That is, for a process Q, fv(Q)∩bv(Q) = ∅. We now give an examples illustrating the type of protocols that can be modeled and analyzed in our process algebra.
Example 1. In a simple DC-net protocol, two parties Alice and Bob want to anonymously publish two confidential bits m A and m B , respectively. To achieve this, Alice and Bob agree on three private random bits b 0 , b 1 and b 2 and output a pair of messages according to the following scheme. In our specification of the protocol, all of the private bits will be generated by Alice.
From the protocol output, the messages m A and m B can be retrieved as M A,0 ⊕M B,0 and M A,1 ⊕M B,1 . The party to which the messages belong, however, remains unconditionally private, provided the exchanged secrets are not revealed. This protocol can be modeled using the equational theory built on the signature
with the following equations.
The roles of Alice and Bob in this protocol are defined in our process syntax as follows.
Notice that the output of Bob depends on the value of Alice's coin flip. Because our process calculus does not contain else branches, the required functionality is embedded in the equational theory. Also notice that the communication between Alice and Bob in the above specification requires a pre-established secret keys k 1 , k 2 . These keys are established by first running some key exchange protocol, which can be modeled by the context 
Semantics
Given a process P , an extended process is a 3-tuple (P, ϕ, σ) where ϕ is a frame and σ is a binding substitution. Semantically, a ground process P is a POMDP (partially observable Markov decision process) (Z, z s , Act, ∆, O, obs), where Z is the set of all extended processes, z s is the start state (P, ∅, ∅), Act is the set of actions (pairs containing a recipe and an equivalence classes on labels), ∆ is a probabilistic transition relation describing how a process evolves, O is a countable set of observations used to model information available to the attacker and obs is a labeling of states with observations. Informally, a process evolves as follows. After i execution steps, if the process is in state z, the attacker chooses an action α, which together with the state z defines a unique probability distribution µ given by the transition relation ∆. The process then moves to state z in the (i + 1)-st step with probability µ(z ). The only constraint on the choice of the action α is that the same action must be chosen in all executions which are indistinguishable to the attacker. We give the formal definitions below.
The set of all actions is Act = (T (F \ N , X w ) ∪ {τ }, L/ ∼). In Figure 2 , we define ∆ which maps an extend process and an action to a distribution on Z.
There we write (P, ϕ, σ) Figure 2 , µ·Q denotes the distribution µ 1 such that µ 1 (P , ϕ, σ) = µ(P, ϕ, σ) if P is P · Q and 0 otherwise. The distributions µ|Q and Q|µ are defined analogously. The notation c i is used to denote the case when c i is or c i is u = v where vars(u, v) ⊆ dom(σ) and uσ = E vσ. Note that ∆ is well-defined, as basic processes are deterministic and each basic process is associated with a unique equivalence class. An execution ρ of a process P is a finite sequence z 0 −−−→ µ, § ∈ T (F \N , X w )∪{τ } and l is the label of an input or output action. For a frame ϕ, we write [ϕ] to denote the equivalence class of ϕ with respect to E, where EQ denotes the set of all such equivalence classes. For O = 2 Act × EQ, define obs as a function from extended processes to O such that for any extended process η = (P, ϕ, σ), obs(η) = (enabled(η) . The set of all traces of a process P is denoted Trace(P ). A trace models the view of the attacker for a particular execution. An attacker for a process P is a partial function A : Trace(P ) → Act. An attacker resolves all non-determinism, and when a process P is executed with respect to a fixed attacker A, the evolution of the process P can be described by a DTMC P A . For process P , adversary A and trace t, let ρ 1 , ..., ρ k be the executions of P A such that tr(ρ i ) = t for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}. We will write prob(t, P A ) to denote k i=1 prob(t, P A ). An extended process (Q, ϕ, σ) over the equational theory (F, E) preserves the secrecy of x ∈ vars(Q), written (Q, ϕ, σ) |= E x, if there is no r ∈ T (F \ N , dom(ϕ)) such that ϕ r E xσ. A process P is said to keep variables x 1 , ..., x n secret with probability 1, denoted P |= E,1 secret(x 1 , ..., x n ), if there is no execution of P containing a state z such that z |= E x for some x ∈ {x 1 , ..., x n }. Two processes P 0 and P 1 over the same set of actions and observations are said to be trace equivalent, denoted P 0 ≈ P 1 , if for every attacker A and trace t ∈ Trace(P 0 ) ∪ Trace(P 1 ), prob(t, P A 0 ) = prob(t, P A 1 ). Observe that for a protocol P not containing coin tosses, any two executions of P are distinguishable. Furthermore, for each attacker A, there is only one execution of protocol P . Thus, it follows that our notion of trace equivalence coincides with the notion of trace-equivalence of for applied pi-calculus. We conclude this section by showing how the notion of trace equivalence can capture privacy properties of the DC-net protocol described earlier in this section. which says that any attacker for the DC-net protocol will observe identical probabilities for every sequence of protocol outputs, regardless of the bits that Alice and Bob hold in their messages.
3 Compositional equivalence of single session protocols
Disjoint Data
In the case of non-randomized protocols, it is well known that composition preserves equivalence when protocols do not share data. Recall that we have introduced a new notion of equivalence for randomized protocols wherein two protocols P, Q are equivalent if, for every attacker A and trace t, the event t has equal probability in the Markov chains P A and Q A . A cornerstone of our result establishes that parallel composition is a congruence with respect to this equivalence when protocols do not share data.
Lemma 1. Let P, P , Q, Q be closed processes such that vars(P ) ∩ vars(Q) = ∅ and vars(P ) ∩ vars(Q ) = ∅. If P ≈ P and Q ≈ Q then P |Q ≈ P |Q .
In the absence of probabilistic choice, Lemma 1 is obtained by transforming an attacker A for P |Q into an attacker A that "simulates" Q to P (and vice versa). When a term created by Q is forwarded to P by A, the attacker A forwards a new recipe in which the nonces in the term created by Q are replaced by fresh nonces created by the adversary. This technique is not directly applicable in the presence of randomness, where the adversary must forward a common term to P in every indistinguishable execution of P |Q. For example, if the outputs n 1 and h(n 2 ) from Q are forwarded by A to P in two indistinguishable executions, the recipe constructed by A must be identical for both executions. Further complicating matters, if n 2 is latter revealed by Q, the simulation of n 1 and h(n 2 ) to P via a common term can introduce in-equivalences that were not present in the original executions. We prove the result by showing P ≈ P ⇒ P |Q ≈ P |Q and Q ≈ Q ⇒ P |Q ≈ P |Q , which together imply Lemma 1. Each sub-goal is obtained by first inducting on the number of probabilistic choices in the common process. In the case of P |Q ≈ P |Q, for example, this allows one to formulate an adversary A for P |Q (resp. P |Q) as a combination of two disjoint adversaries. We then appeal to a result on POMDPs where we prove that the asynchronous product of POMDPs preserves equivalence.
Disjoint Primitives
In our composition result, we would like to argue that if two contexts C[ ] and C [ ] are equivalent and two basic process B and B are equivalent, then the processes C[B] and C [B ] are trace equivalent. In such a setup, contexts can instantiate data (keys) that are used by and occur free in the basic processes. This setup provides a natural way to model and reason about protocols that begin by carrying out a key exchange before transitioning into another phase of the protocol. Its worth pointing out that the combination of key exchange with anonymity protocols can indeed lead to errors. For example, it was observed in [48] that the RSA implementation of mix networks leads to a degradation in the level of anonymity provided by the mix. The formalization of our main composition result is as follows.
with labels from L c . Further let B 1 , ..., B n (resp. B 1 , . .., B n ) be basic processes over F b with labels from L b . For l 1 , ..., l n ∈ L b and ∈ F b ∪ F c , assume that the following hold.
Proof Sketch. 
., B n ]
A ), to construct a trace t that witnesses a violation of condition 5 or 6 from Theorem 1. We can show that if
where B 0 and B 0 are processes that bind {x 1 , ..., x n } and {x 1 , ..., x n }, respectively. This transformation is a non-trival extension of a result from [27, 4] which allows a process P |Q, where P and Q share common variables but are over disjoint signatures, to be transformed into an "equivalent" process P |Q where variables are no longer shared. Variables of Q are re-initialized in Q according to the equational equivalences they respect in an execution of P |Q. Unlike nondeterministic processes, where executions are sequences, executions in randomized processes form a tree where variables can receive different values in different branches of the tree. From equation 1, we can apply Lemma 1 to achieve either
In the former case, we have contradicted condition 5 of Theorem 1. If we achieve
, we additionally need to transform an adversary that witnesses the in-equivalence to an adversary that witnesses the in-equivalence νk · (
The presence of randomness makes this transformation tricky, as illustrated by Example 3 below.
out(h(x 1 ))) and
out(h(x 1 ))) in the processes below.
Consider the adversary A that forwards the output of P (resp. P ) to Q (resp. Q ) and then runs B 2 (resp. B 2 ). A is a witness to the in-equivalence of P |Q and P |Q , but it does not witness the in-equivalence of νk 1 · (x 1 := k 1 ) · (B 1 |B 2 ) and νk 1 · (x 1 := k 1 ) · (B 1 |B 2 ). We can, however, transform the attacker A to an attacker A that witnesses
The details of this transformation can be found in the full version [1] .
Below, we demonstrate the application of Theorem 1 to reason about the security of the DC-net protocol from Example 1, where Diffie-Hellman is used for key exchange.
Example 4. Let A, B be the protocols for Alice and Bob from the DC-net protocol given in Example 1. Let F DH = {f, g, mac} be the signature for the equational theory
This equational theory models the Diffie-Hellman primitives, i.e. f (x, y) = x y mod p, g(y) = α y mod p for some group generator α. We use mac for a keyed hash func-
to be the context that models a variant of the Diffie-Hellman protocol where D 1 and D 2 are below.
We want to show the equivalence
. Using the results established in Theorem 1, the verification effort is reduced to verifying the following set of simpler properties, where
The latter properties can also be verified modularly using the results from [10] .
Difficulties arising from randomization
In the setup from Theorem 1, observe that C[ ], C [ ] contain process (free) variables. As a result, trace equivalence cannot directly be used to equate these objects. Example 5. Consider the contexts defined below.
Notice that C and C differ in that C assigns x 2 to k 1 and C assigns x 2 to k 1 . For the basic processes B 1 = out(h(x 1 )) and B 2 = out(h(x 2 )). We have
. This is because for any ad-
A both have the same set of traces. However, there is an adversary A such that the only trace of
A there are two traces, one that outputs h(k 1 ), h(k 2 ) and another that outputs h(k 1 ), h(k 1 ).
The problematic behavior arising in Example 5 occurs when basic processes reveal equalities among the shared secrets from the context. Revealing these equalities may, in some cases, allow the attacker to infer the result of a private coin toss. Consequently, our composition theorem must require contexts to remain secure even when such equalities are revealed. As was the case with composition contexts, our result also relies on a notion of equivalence between basic processes B and B that contain free variables. Universal quantification over the free variables results in a non-trivial computational overhead. However, we are able to show that when B is not trace equivalent to B under some instantiation the free variables, then B and B can also be shown to be trace in-equivalent when all of the free variables take the same value. This allows us to prove a stronger result by requiring a weaker condition on the equivalence between B and B .
In Theorem 1, condition 4 requires that the composed processes do not reveal the shared secrets with probability 1. As in [10] , one might also be interested in the quantitative version of this result, where the probability of revealing the shared secrets is below a given threshold. Unfortunately, condition 4 cannot be relaxed, as shown by Example 6 below.
Example 6. Consider the contexts
and the basic process B = νn · out(
Another subtle component of Theorem 1 is condition 1, which allows each basic process to share only a single variable with the context. As demonstrated Example 7, the composition theorem does not hold when this restriction is relaxed.
Example 7. Consider the context and processes below. (x 1 , x 2 ) ).
Shared primitives through tagging
Theorem 1 requires that the context and basic processes don't share cryptographic primitives. To extend the result to processes that allow components of the composition to share primitives, such as functions for encryption, decryption and hashing, we utilize a syntactic transformation of a protocol and its signature called tagging. When a protocol is tagged, a special identifier is appended to each of the messages that it outputs. On input, the protocol recursively tests all subterms of the input message to verify their tags are consistent with the protocol's tag. If this requirement is not met, the protocol deadlocks. The details of our tagging scheme, which are simailar to the ones given in [4, 27] , can be found in Appendix B. In Theorem 2, we show that an attack on a composition of two tagged protocols originating from the same signature can be mapped to an attack on the composition of the protocols when the signatures are explicitly made disjoint. Given a context C[ 1 , ..., n ] and basic processes B 1 , ..., B n we write C[B 1 , ..., B n ] to denote the tagged version of C[B 1 , ..., B n ]. Our tagging result considers the fixed equational theory where F senc = {senc, sdec, h} and E senc = {sdec(senc(m, k), k) = m}. For this theory, we define a signature renaming function d which transforms a context C over the signature (F senc , E senc ) to a context C d by replacing every occurrence of the function symbols senc, sdec and h in C by senc d , sdec d and h d , respectively.
) be a context over F senc with labels from L c . Further let B 1 , ..., B n (resp. B 1 , ..., B n ) be basic processes over F senc with labels from L b . For l 1 , ..., l n ∈ L b and ∈ F b ∪ F c , assume that the following hold.
Compositional equivalence for multi-session protocols
In this section, we extend our composition result to protocols that can run multiple sessions. Our focus will be on protocols that have a single occurrence of the replication operator appearing in the context. This restriction simplifies the statement of the results and proofs. However, it is possible to extend our results to protocols with a more general framework for replication. Formally, a context with replication is over the following grammar.
where a ∈ {νx, (x := u)}. The semantics of this new replication operator are given in Figure 3 , where i ∈ N is used to denoted the smallest previously unused index. We will write P (i) to denote that process that results from renaming each occurrence of x ∈ vars(P ) to x i for i ∈ N. When P (i) is relabeled freshly as in Figure 3 , the new labels must all belong to the same equivalence class (that contains only those labels).
P (i) is relabeled freshly
Fig. 3: Replication semantics
Our semantics imposes an explicit variable renaming with each application of a replication rule. The reason for this is best illustrated through an example. Consider the process !in(x) · P and the execution
where variable renaming does not occur. This execution corresponds to the attacker replicating !in(x)·P , running one instance of in(x)·P and then replicating !in(x) · P again. Note that, because x is bound at the end of the above execution, the semantics of the input action cause the process to deadlock at in(x). In other words, an attacker can only effective run one copy of !in(x) · P for any process of the form !in(x) · P . Our composition result must prevent messages from one session of a process from being confused with messages from another sessions. We achieve this by introducing an occurrence of νλ directly following the replication operator. This freshly generated "session tag" will then be used to augment tags occurring in the composed processes. Recall that for any POMDPs M 1 and M 2 , if M 1 ≈ M 2 there exists an adversary A and trace t such that prob(t, A ) where M 1 , M 2 do not contain replication. This is achieved by syntactically unrolling the replication operator |t| times in M 1 (resp. M 2 ). The result below is a consequence of the preceding observation and Theorem 2. Further let B 1 , ..., B n (resp. B 1 , . .., B n ) be basic processes over F senc with labels from L b . For l 1 , ..., l n ∈ L b and ∈ F b ∪ F c , assume that the following hold. 
Conclusions and Future Work
We have considered the problem of composition for randomized security protocols, initially analyzing protocols with a bounded number of sessions. Formally, consider trace equivalent protocols P and Q over equational theory E a , and trace equivalent protocols P and Q over equational theory E b . We showed that the composition of P and P with Q and Q preserves trace equivalence, provided E a and E b are disjoint. The same result applies to the case when both equational theories coincide and consist of symmetric encryption/decryption and hashes, provided each protocol message is tagged with a unique identifier for the protocol to which it belongs. Finally, we show that the latter result extends to protocols with an unbounded number of sessions, as long as messages from each session of the protocol are tagged with a unique session identifier. For future work, we plan to investigate protocols that allow dis-equality tests amongst messages. We also plan to investigate the composition problem when the equational theories coincide and contain other cryptographic primitives in addition to symmetric encryption/decryption and hashes.
A Bound variables
For a basic process B, we define bv(B), fv(B) as the set of variables that have a bound or free occurrence in B, respectively. Likewise, abv(B) denotes the set of variables for which every occurrence in B is bound. We define these formally below. 
